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Spontaneous dialogue is a highly interactive endeavour in
which interlocutors constantly influence each other’s actions.
As addressees they provide feedback of perception, under-
standing, acceptance, and attitude [1]. As speakers they adapt
their speech to the perceived needs of the addressee, propose
new terms and names, make creative references, draw upon
established and known to be shared knowledge, etc. This
makes dialogue a ‘joint activity’ [7] whose outcome is not
determined up front but shaped by the interlocutors while the
interaction unfolds over time.
One of the tasks interlocutors need to carry out while
being engaged in a dialogue is keeping track of the dialogue
information state. This is usually considered to be a rich
representation of the dialogue context, most importantly in-
cluding which information is grounded and which is still
pending to be grounded (and potentially much more informa-
tion; see, e.g., [10]). Whether such a detailed representation
of the information state is necessary – and whether it is a cog-
nitively plausible assumption – for participating in dialogue
is a topic of ongoing debate.
On the one hand, Brennan and Clark [2,7] state that
speakers maintain a detailed model of common ground and
design their utterance to the exact needs of their communica-
tion partners – even to the extent that approximate versions
of mutual knowledge may be necessary to explain certain
dialogue phenomena [8]. On the other hand, Pickering and
Garrod [11] argue that – for reasons of efficiency – dialogue
cannot involve heavy inference on common ground, but is
an automatic process that relies on priming and activation
of linguistic representations and uses interactive repair upon
miscommunication. A position that falls in between this di-
chotomy is Galati and Brennan’s [9] lightweight one-bit part-
ner model (e.g., has the addressee heard this before or not)
that can be used instead of full common ground when produ-
cing an utterance.
We propose that interlocutors in dialogue engage in dy-
namic minimal mentalizing, a process that goes beyond the
single properties in the focus of Galati and Brennan’s [9]
‘one-bit’ model, but is comparable in computational effi-
ciency. We assume that speakers maintain a probabilistic,
multidimensional (consisting of a fixed number of state vari-
ables), and dynamic ‘attributed listener state’ [5]. We model
this as a dynamic Bayesian network representation (see Fig. 1)
that is continuously updated by the addressees’ communic-
ative feedback (i.e., short verbal-vocal expressions such a
‘uh-huh,’ ‘yeah,’ ‘huh?’; head gestures; facial expressions)
seen as evidence of understanding in response to ongoing
utterances.
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Figure 1 The dynamic Bayesian network model for dynamic minimal
mentalizing. The network consists of the mental state variables for con-
tact (C), perception (P), understanding (U), acceptance (AC), agreement
(AG), and groundedness (GR) attributed to the listener.
The proposed model is multidimensional because it rep-
resents the listeners’ mental state of listening in terms of the
various communicative functions that can be expressed in
feedback [1]: is the listener in contact?; is he or she will-
ing and able to perceive and understand what is said?; and
does he or she accept the message and agrees to it? Instead
of making a decision conditioned on the question whether
the interlocutor has heard something before, this model al-
lows to make use of the still computationally feasible but
richer knowledge of whether he or she has likely perceived,
understood, etc. a previously made utterance.
Further, the model is fully probabilistic since the attrib-
uted mental states are modelled in a Bayesian network. Each
dimensions is represented as a random variable and the prob-
abilities over the state of each variable (e.g., low, medium,
high understanding) are interpreted in terms of the speaker’s
degree of belief in the addressee being in a specific state.
This is a graded form of common ground [3] and presup-
position (e.g., this knowledge is most likely in the common
ground; see variables GR and GR′ in Figure 1), which can be
accommodated by, e.g., interactively leaving information out
or adding redundant information; or by making information
pragmatically implicit or explicit.
Finally, since the model is based on a dynamic Bayesian
network, the interpretation of incoming feedback signals
from the addressee is influenced by the current belief state,
and changes of the attributed listener state are tracked over
time. Representing these dynamics provides speakers with
a broader basis for production choices as well as enabling
strategic placement of feedback elicitation cues based on
informational needs. It also allows for a prediction of the ad-
dressee’s likely future mental state, thus enabling anticipatory
adaptation of upcoming utterances.
In current work, the model of dynamic minimal mentaliz-
ing is being applied and evaluated in a virtual conversational
agent that is able to interpret its user’s communicative feed-
back and adapt its own language accordingly [4,6].
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